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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Petitioner, convicted of first degree murder sentenced to death while represented by a 
lawyer without co-counsel, who had only a few years earlier graduated law school, and who had 
no experience whatsoever in capital litigation, filed his third and fourth postconviction petitions 
in district court in 2002. In his third postconviction petition, he sought the benefit of Ring v. 
Arizona, 536 US. 584. The distsict court denied relief in that case, and it is now pending before 
the court. The instant case is an appeal from the district court's denial of his fourth 
postconviction petition in which he sought relief based on a host of ineffective assistance of 
counsel claims and prosecutorial misconduct claims. 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Whether Idaho Code Section 19-2719 properly governs this case. 
2. Assuming arguendo that Section 19-2719 does properly govern this case, whether that 
statute's time bars apply or, alternatively, whether they must be struck as violating the 
state and/or federal constitutions. 
3. Whether Idaho courts have jurisdiction to consider claims brought pursuant to the Idaho 
constitutional right to habeas corpus. 
4. Whether the Idaho courts should reach the merits of Petitioner's claims. 
ARGUMENT 
I. IDAHO CODE SECTION 19-2719 DOES NOT GOVERN THESE 
POSTCONVICTION PROCEEDINGS. 
Pursuant to Idaho Code Section 19-2719, the court below summarily dismissed Mr. 
Stuart's petition seeking postconviction relief. Yet Section 19-2719 violates the Idaho 
Constitution, other Idaho law, and the federal constitution. Thus, it cannot govern these 
proceedings. 
A. Idaho Code Section 19-2719 Violates The Idaho Constitution's Prohibition 
Against Ex Post Facto Laws. 
Petitioner seeks relief from a 1982 death sentence. Idaho Code Section 19-2719 did not 
yet exist. That statute was first enacted in 1984. The state and federal constitutions each prohibit 
expost facro laws. U.S.Const. art. I, $10, cl. 1. Idaho Const. art. I, $16. Applying a law enacted 
after the commission of the crime to "make more burdensome the punishment" violates the ex 
post facto clause. Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37,52 (1990). For example, in Garner v. 
Jones, 529 U.S. 244 (2000), the United States Supreme Court held that increasing the interval 
between parole reconsiderations may violate the expostfacto clause. Whether it does depends, 
the Court held, on whether the change "creates a significant risk" of making the punishment 
more burdensome -there, by prolonging the respondent's incarceration. 
The court below rejected this argument, further explicated below, apparently on the 
ground that Section 19-2719(S)(c) does not increase the punishment for criminal acts because: 
the argument seems to go, Petitioner's sentence is not increased. 
While Section 19-2719's provisions may appear at first glance to implicate none of the 
categories of laws which violate the expost facto prohibition, neither did the statute struck down 
in Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24 (1980). There, the challenged statute removed "gain time for 
good conduct" granted to prison inmates. Id at 25. The state argued that the revised statute 
could not run afoul of the expost facto clause because it was "'no part of the original sentence 
and thus no part of the punishment annexed to the crime at the time petitioner was sentenced."' 
Id. at 3 1 (quoting State's brief). The Court rejected this argument, noting, first, that "we need not 
determine whether the prospect of the gain time was in some technical sense part of the sentence 
to conclude that it in fact is one determinant of petitioner's prison term-and that his effective 
sentence is altered once this determinant is changed" and, second, that "we have held that a 
statue may be retrospective even if it alters punitive conditions outside the sentence." Thus, a 
statute may sufficiently affect a sentence so as to violate the expost facto prohibition even 
though it constitutes no part of the imposed sentence. As the Supreme Court noted in California 
Department of Corrections v. Morales, 514 U.S. 499 (1995), "We have previously declined to 
articulate a single 'formula' for identifying those legislative changes that have a sufficient effect 
on substantive crimes or punishments to fall within the constitutional prohibition, and we have 
no occasion to do so here." Id. at 509 (citation omitted). Instead, the test for determining 
whether a change in law violates the expost facto prohibition is whether the change "created 'a 
sufficient risk of increasing the measure of punishment attached to the covered crimes.' 
[Morales, 514 U.S.] at 509." Garner v. Jones, 529 U.S. 244 (2000). 
The Garner test, however, does more than clarify whether a law which was no part of the 
imposed sentence violates the expost facto prohibition. It also serves to distinguish those 
procedural changes which constitute expost facto violations and those which do not. The court 
below appears to reject Mr. Stuart's claim on the ground that Section 19-2719 is procedural in 
nature. Applying the Garner test demonstrates that the procedural changes enacted by Section 
19-2719 run afoul of the expost facto clause. 
Applying Sections 19-2719(3) & (5) to Mr. Stuart's case would unquestionably create a 
significant risk of making his sentence more burdensome than if the Uniform Post-Conviction 
Procedure Act ("UPUPA") were applied. For while those statutory sections contemplate barring 
claims not raised within 42 days of the filing of the judgment regardless of petitioner's mental 
state in relation to those claims and their waiver, under the UPUPA a petitioner's delay in 
asserting claims may be deemed a waiver only if he knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently 
waived the claims. I.C. 519-4808. As this Court has held: 
In capital cases, a successive petition is allowed only where the 
petitioner can demonstrate that the issues raised were not known or 
could not reasonably have been known within the 42-day time 
frame. This is in contrast with the UPUPA, which requires waiver 
to be knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. LC. 3 19-4908. 
McKinney v. State, 133 Idaho 695,701,992 P.2d 144, 150 (Idaho1999). Because the Section 19- 
4908 hurdle is significantly lower for petitioners than the Section 19-2719 hurdle, it is more 
likely that the Court would reach the merits of Mr. Stuart's claims if he were required to clear the 
former and not the latter. This was, of course, the Idaho legislature's expressed purpose in 
enacting Section 19-2719, as is clear form the contrast between the statute and Section 19-4908, 
McKinney, as well as the legislature's explicitly described purpose. LC. 519-2719 ("The 
following special procedures shall be interpreted to accomplish the purpose of eliminating 
unnecessary delay in carrying out a valid death sentence.") (italics added). Further, Mr. Stuart's 
claims are remarkably strong. The relative strength of his claims shows that Mr. Stuart would 
likely prevail on their merits and thus obtain a reduced sentence and/or vacation of his 
conviction. Thus, not only does the statutory change and purpose in enacting Section 19-2719 
allow an inference that the change created "a sufficient high risk of increasing the measure of 
punishment attached to the covered crimes" such that it violates the expost facto clause, the facts 
of the instant case compel it. Garner, 529 U.S. at 250. Because death is a more burdensome 
penalty than life, Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S.  399,411 (1986) (plurality opinion) ("execution is 
the most irremediable and unfathomable of penalties; . . .death is different."), applying Section 
19-2719 to block a merits review of Mr. Stuart's ineffective assistance of counsel claims 
constitutes an expost fucto violation. 
B. Section 19-2719 Violates Idaho's Prohibition Against The Retroactive 
Application Of New Statutes. 
Mr. Stuart's contends that LC. $19-2719(3) is inapplicable because when enacted in its 
current version in 2001, it did not include any express language that it is to be retroactively 
applied. LC. 573-101. The court below ruled that because when I.C. $19-2719 was enacted in 
1984, it included in the session law an express statement that it was to be retroactively applied, 
and that statement covers all subsequent versions as well. Yet this Court has held that "an 
amendment to an existing statute will not, absent an express legislative statement to the contrary, 
be held to be retroactive in application." Nebeker v. Piper Aircraft Corporation, 113 Idaho 609, 
614,747 P.2d 18,23 (Idaho 1987) (citations omitted). The 1984 version's declaration of 
retroactive affect has no application here because it was not in effect at the time petitioner filed 
the instant postconviction petition. Rather, the statute in effect at the time the petition was filed 
governs. 
This Court's holding that Section 19-2719(3) "creates, defines, and regulates a primary 
right" and is, therefore, substantive in nature, compels the same conclusion. State v. Beam, 121 
Idaho 862,828 P.2d 891,893 (Idaho1992). For as the Court has long held, 
[I]t also is the rule in Idaho that retroactive legislation is only that 
which affects vested or already existing rights. Remedial or 
procedural statutes which do not create, enlarge, diminish or 
destroy contractual or vested rights are generally held to operate 
retrospectively. 
City of Garden City v. City of Boise, 104 Idaho 512,515,660 P.2d 1355,1358 (Idaho1983) 
(citations omitted). Applying Idaho Code Section 19-2719(3) to this case would, therefore, 
constitute a retroactive application in violation of Idaho code Section73-101. 
11. IDAHO CODE 919-2719(5)'~ UNTIMELY CLAIMS BAR HAS NO 
APPLICATION HERE. 
The court below rejected Mr. Stuart's claim that Section 19-2719's current prohibition 
against claims which were known or reasonably should have been known but were not raised in a 
timely filed initial postconviction petition has no application to his case. But the amended 
provision on which the Court relies, Idaho Code Section 19-2719(5), cannot be retroactively 
applied to the instant case. As well, Idaho Code Section 19-2719(5) violates the Idaho 
Constitution's separation of powers mandate, the Idaho and United States Constitutions' 
prohibition against expost facto laws, and Mr. Stuart's rights to due process and equal protection 
as guaranteed by the United States and Idaho constitutions. 
A. Idaho Code Section 19-2719(5)'s Bar Against Claims Already Known Or 
Which Should Reasonably Have Been Known Cannot Be Retroactively 
Applied Here. 
It is long settled "that an amendment to an existing statute will not, absent an express 
legislative statement to the contrary, be held to be retroactive in application. Johnson v. 
Stoddard, 96 Idaho 230, 526 P.2d 835 (1974)[.lV Nebeker v. Piper Aircraft Corporation, 113 
Idaho 609,614,747 P.2d 18,23 (Idaho 1987)(citations omitted) (emphasis added). See Idaho 
Code Section 73-101 ("No part of these compiled laws is retroactive, unless expressly so 
declared.") The lower court's rejection of this claim was based on the fact that when Section 19- 
2719 was enacted in 1984, the legislature included in the session law language making it 
retroactive. Mr. Stuart does not claim otherwise. Rather, he contends that because the legislature 
did not include similar express retroactivity language when amending subsection (a) into Section 
19-2719(5), Idaho Code Section 73-101 precludes that subsection's retroactive application to the 
instant case. 
Though the instant petition was filed after Idaho Code Section 19-2719(5) was amended 
to include subsection (a), applying that statutory provision in this case would constitute a 
retroactive application. Paradis v. State, 128 Idaho 223, 912 P.2d 110 (Idaho 1996), illustrates 
why. There, the lower court applied a statute enacted after the trial and direct appeal were 
concluded. The Supreme Court held that the statute's application was prospective, not 
retroactive, because (1) the statute changed postconviction procedures and did not materially 
affect any substantive rights of the appellant and (2) "the statutory limitations period [for filing 
the postconviction petition] had not yet run." Id. at 227, 114. 
The statutory provision at issue in this case stands in dramatic contrast to the one at issue 
in Paradis. In particular, Paradis merely prescribed a procedural requirement available to every 
postconviction petitioner-that the petition be filed within a statutorily specified time. Far from 
prescribing a procedure available to all seeking relief, Idaho Code Section 5 19-27 19(5)(c) 
purports to raise an absolute bar to relief on any claim based on the retroactive application of a 
new rule of law. The distinction is critical. The procedural requirement at issue in Paradis 
affected no substantive rights because all postconviction petitioners could comply with it. By 
contrast, Section 19-2719(5)(c) does not create mere procedural requirements. Rather, it 
precludes an entire class of substantive claims, leaving postconviction petitioners with no 
mechanism by which to assert those claims. Put another way, Section 19-2719(5) does not 
merely "affect" this class of substantive rights, it purports to destroy them. For this same reason, 
the second ground for the Paradis court's holding has no application here. Consequently, 
applying Idaho Code Section 19-2719(5)(c) to Mr. Stuart would constitute a retroactive 
appIication. 
Federal courts have noted that this same question may arise with regard to the 
Antiterrorism And Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"). While the United States 
Supreme Court has held that, as a general rule, AEDPA applies to petitions filed after the act's 
enactment, it has also noted that specific AEDPA provisions may not be applied if doing so 
would have a retroactive effect. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320,327-28 (1997). As the Fourth 
Circuit concluded: 
We agree with petitioner and those courts that having had cause to consider the 
question in full, have concluded that the Supreme court did not hold in Lindh that 
courts are necessarily to apply the new provisions of chapter 153 to all habeas 
petitions filed after April 24, 1996 [i.e.- AEDPA's enactment date]. More 
particularly, we hold that Lindh did not foreclose-and indeed contemplated- 
continuing resort to Landgraf [i.e.-retroactivity of statutes] analysis in order to 
ensure that application of chapter 153's new provisions is not impermissibly 
retroactive in such cases. 
Mueller v. Angelone, 181 F.3d 557,567 (4Ih Cir. 1999)(citing to In re Hansard, 123 F.3d 922, 
933 n.22 (6th Cir. 1997), and citing to in re Minarik, 166 F.3d 591 (3rd Cir. 1999), and Brown v. 
Angelone, 150 F.3d 370 (4"' Cir. 1998)). See Scott v. Boos, 215 F.3d 940, 949 (91h Cir. 
2000)(federal prohibition against retroactive application of statute absent clear Congressional 
statement of intent looks to "parties' actions, not the date of filing"). 
Though Idaho Code Section 19-2719(5)(a) expressly purports to absolutely bar successive 
postconviction petitioners' claims unless they were not known or could not reasonably have 
been known within the prescribed time for filing the initial postconviction petition, it contains no 
express legislative statement that it should itself be retroactively applied. It cannot, then, be 
applied to the case at bar. 
B. Idaho Code Section 19-2719 Invades the Judiciary's Province, In Violation 
Of The Idaho Constitution's Separation Of Powers Requirement. 
The court below ruled that Idaho Code Section 19-2719(5) bars Mr. Stuart's claims 
because he did not raise them in his initial postconviction proceedings. C.R. at 652-57. 
(Memorandum Opinion at 16-21). That statute provides that if a petitioner "fails to apply for 
relief. . . within the time limits specified, . . . [tlhe courts of Idaho shall have no power to 
consider any such claims for relief[.]" I.C. $19-2719(5). This violates the Idaho Constitution's 
separation of powers requirement by limiting the constitutionally defined original jurisdiction of 
the district court. 
The Idaho Constitution, Article V, Section 20, confers original jurisdiction on the district 
court to hear all cases. Idaho Constitution, Article 11, Section 1, mandates that the powers of the 
three governmental branches remain separate, and, more particularly, Article V, Section 13, 
specifically prohibits legislative restriction of judicial jurisdiction: 
The legislature shall have no power to deprive the judicial 
department of any power or jurisdiction which rightly pertains to it 
as a coordinate department of the government; but the legislature 
shall provide a proper system of appeals, and regulate by law, 
when necessary, the methods of proceeding in the exercise of their 
powers of all the courts below the Supreme Court, so far as the 
same may be done without conflict with the Constitution[.] 
Id. (italics added). Of course, as the Supreme Court has long held, a Section 19-2719 petition "is 
a proceeding entirely new and independent from the criminal action which led to the conviction." 
Paradis v. State, 110 Idaho 534,636, 716 P.2d 1306, 1308 (Idah01986). Thus, Article V, $13 '~ 
reservation of power to the legislature has no application to Section 19-271 9 proceedings since 
they are not appeals. 
The sole case relied on by the court below, Kirkland v. Blaine County Medical Center, 
134 Idaho 464,4 P.3d 11 15 (Idaho 2000), is inapposite. Kirkland cannot account for the 
constitutional guarantee that the "writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended, unless in case of 
rebellion or invasion, the public safety requires it, and then only in such manner as shall be 
prescribed by law." Idaho Const. art. 1, $5. In Kirkland, the Court nowhere addressed the 
interplay between the legislature's power to limit remedies available to plaintiffs and any 
constitutional rights vested in plaintiffs. By stark contrast, Petitioner is constitutionally 
guaranteed the right to seek a writ of habeas corpus and Idaho courts hold that this remedy may 
now be sought only through the vehicle of a postconviction petition. This means that the 
legislature's prerogative to limit remedies in the postconviction context is not without constraint. 
Rather, the limits may not suspend the writ. The fact that district courts did reach the merits of 
habeas claims filed outside the Section 19-2719 time restrictions, demonstrates that the statute 
suspends the writ in violation of the constitutional guarantee. Mahafey v. State, 87 Idaho 228, 
229-30,392 P.2d 279 (Idaho1964) (reversing district court dismissal of successive habeas 
petition brought ten years after conviction). In short, while the legislature's express streamlining 
purpose in enacting Section 19-2719 may have been permissible, its chosen means violated the 
separation of powers constitutional requirement. 
It is Section 19-2719(5)'s removing district court jurisdiction to even consider 
postconviction petitions filed outside the legislatively mandated limitations period which violates 
the Idaho Constitution's separation of power mandate. Boise City v. Better Homes, Inc., 72 Idaho 
441,444-45,243 P.2d 303,304 (Idalio1952) ("[tlhe original jurisdiction conferred upon the 
district court by the constitution, Art. 5, $20, cannot be diminished by the legislature. Const.Art. 
5, $13[.]"); Clemons v. Kinsley, 72 Idaho 251,256-57,239 P.2d 266,269 (Idahol951) ( "[tlhe 
broad jurisdiction [created by Art. 5, $131 is not subject to diminution by legislative act."). In 
short, the Idaho Supreme Court has consistently and long held that the legislature may not 
directly or otherwise restrict the district court's jurisdiction. Consequently, the Court should 
remand this case for fkrther proceedings. 
C. Idaho Code Section 19-2519 Violates Petitioner's Rights To Due Process And 
Equal Protection Guaranteed Under The United States And Idaho 
Constitutions. 
If Mr. Stuart did not stand under sentence of death, Idaho Code $19-2719(5) limitations 
provisions would not apply.' "LC. 519-2719 does not eliminate the applicability of the UPUPA 
to capital cases, but it supersedes the UPUPA to the extent that their provisions conflict." 
McGivney v. State, 133 Idaho 695,700,992 P.2d 144, 149 (Idaho 1999). Because of this 
difference, I.C. 5 19-2719 violates Mr. Stuart's due process and equal protection rights. 
Precluding Mr. Stuart's claims on the basis of Section 19-2719's limitations provisions violates 
Mr. Stuart's rights to equal protection and due process under the Fourteenth Amendment of the 
United States Constitution, and Article 1, Sections 2 and 13 of the Idaho Constitution, in that 
there is no rational basis, for the disparate treatment of non-capital prisoners who do not need to 
demonstrate the "heightened burden" for postconviction relief which capital petitioners must 
meet, e.g., Paz v. State, 123 Idaho 758,760,852 P.2d 1355, 1357 (Idaho 1993), or meet the 
limitations imposed by LC. S; 19-2719(5), see, e.g., Sivak v. State, 134 Idaho 641,648-49,s P.3d 
636,643-44 (Idaho 2000); Pizzuto v. State, 134 Idaho 793,796-97, 10 P.3d 742,745-46 (Idaho 
1995). Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620,63 1-36 (1995); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living 
Center, 473 U.S. 432,446-51 (1985); Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55,61-63 (1982); U.S.D.A. v. 
Moreno, 413 U.S. 528,535 (1973); Sterling H Nelson & Sons, Inc. v. Bender, 95 Idaho 813, 
815-16,520 P.2d 860,861-62 (Idaho 1974). 
Idaho's disparate treatment of capital as compared to non-capital postconviction 
petitioners fails under a rational basis analysis. The state's interest in expeditious handling of 
'Under the Uniform Post Conviction Procedure Act ("UPCPA"), "post-conviction relief 
is not barred where new evidence is discovered, or where later case law suggests a conviction is 
unlawfu" Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758, 766 n. 12, 760 P.2d, 1 174, I 182 n. 12 (Idaho 1988) 
(citing LC.$ 19-4901) (emphasis added). Also, under the UPCPA, I.C. S; 19-4908, a claim can 
only be waived ifthe waiver is knowing, voluntary and intelligent. McKinney v. State, 133 Idaho 
695,700-01,922 P.2d 144, 149-50 (Idaho 1999). As noted in the text, to the extent that Idaho 
Code Section 19-2719 conflicts with the UPUPA, the Section 19-2719 provision governs. 
capital cases, the purpose of the offending limitations provision, is not a sufficiently compelling 
interest to justify the violation of petitioner's fundamental right to trial by jury. 
Additionally, to preclude Mr. Stuart's claims would violate his state and federal 
constitutional rights to equal protection inasmuch it would deny him the ability to obtain relief 
for the violation of his constitutional rights solely because his judgment is final. See, e.g., James 
Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529,540 (1991) ("there remains even now the 
disparate treatment of those cases that come to the Court directly and those that come here in 
collateral proceedings"). 
Finally, LC. § 19-2719(5) is unconstitutionally vague. First, the statute imposes an 
internally inconsistent standard of "known" or "should reasonably have known," in subsection 
(5) versus a standard of reasonably "could" have been known in subsection (5)(a). I.C. $19- 
2515(5)(a). There is little question that "should" have known imposes a less stringent standard 
on a petitioner than "could have known." The internally inconsistent standards make application 
of the statute unconstitutionally vague. See, e.g., Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41 (1999)(statute 
"may be impermissibly vague because it fails to establish standards for the police and public that 
are sufficient to guard against the arbitrary deprivation of liberty interests. Kolender v. Lawson, 
461 U.S. 352,358,103 S.Ct. 1855,75 L.Ed.2d 903 (1983)"). 
It is impossible to glean from the statute or case law regarding 19-2719 waiver standard 
exactly what "should reasonably have known" requires. Within the concept of "reasonably 
should have known" is a requirement of at least minimal understanding, and familiarity with 
claims subject to bar. 
Even under an objective standard, the requirement of "reasonableness" put the question of 
default beyond a strict liability mandate that the State seeks to have applied and thus subject to 
hearing, argument, and appellate review. Ineffective assistance of counsel claims are not the 
types of claim that are familiar to the average lay person -they are defined and identified only if 
the party observing the performance (or lack thereof) has legal knowledge in the area under 
question. 
111. IDAHO COURTS HAVE JURISDICTION TO CONSIDER CLAIMS BROUGHT 
BY MR. STUART PURSUANT TO HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO 
HABEAS CORPUS. 
Mr. Stuart styled his August 2,2002, petition in the instant matter as "Petition For Post- 
Conviction Relief And/or Writ Of Habeas Corpus." Though the court below did not address it, 
Respondent argued that the court was without jurisdiction to consider Mr. Stuart's claims as 
habeas claims because Idaho Code Section 19-4202 does not invest district courts with 
jurisdiction to consider petitions for writ of habeas corpus. Because Section 19-4202 has no 
application in the instant matter, Respondent's argument fails. 
Section 19-4202 is part of the Idaho Habeas Corpus and Institutional Litigation 
Procedures Act ("Act"). I.C. @19-4201 - 19-4226. That Act expressly excludes from its scope 
the precise kind of claims Mr. Stuart asserts, viz, those brought via a petition of habeas corpus 
"as a substitute for, or in addition to, . . . . proceedings under Idaho Criminal Rule 35 or the 
Uniform Post-Conviction Procedures Act, chapter 49, title 19[.]" LC. $19-4203(4). Also, the 
legislature enumerated the kind of individuals who may bring claims pursuant to the Act as well 
as the sorts of claims covered by the Act. Neither list covers Mr. Stuart or his claims. Finally, 
the UPUPA "comprehends and takes the place of all other common law, statutory, or other 
remedies heretofore available for challenging the validity of the conviction of sentence." I.C. 
$19-4901(b). ConsequentIy, Respondent's reliance on Idaho Code Section 19-4202 is misplaced 
and its argument that this Court is without jurisdiction to consider Mr. Stuart's claims for a writ 
of habeas corpus fails. 
Of course, the Section 19-4901(b) language quoted in the last paragraph suggests that Mr. 
Stuart's claims for a writ of habeas corpus may be permitted only as claims for UPUPA relief. 
This interpretation fails to capture the important difference between writs of habeas corpus 
petitions and UPUPA relief. Whereas writs of habeas corpus are constitutionally guaranteed 
(Idaho Const., art. 1, $5), the UPUPA petition is a statutory creature. I.C. @19-4901 & 2719. 
Consequently, Section 19-4901(b)'s provision that the UPUPA takes the place of all other 
previously available mechanisms for challenging the validity of convictions and sentences is 
valid only to the extent that the UPUPA does not in any way suspend the writ of habeas corpus. 
Statutes which do not conform to constitutional requirements are invalid. Idaho Schools For 
Equal Educational Opportunity v. Evans, 123 Idaho 573,583,850 P.2d 724,734, reh'g denied 
(1993)(allowing other branches of government "to interpret the constitution for us . . . would be 
an abject abdication of our role in the American system of government"). Therefore, to the 
extent that the UPUPA does suspend the writ of habeas corpus, it is constitutionally deficient and 
may not be enforced. Id. 
The Idaho Constitution, Article I, Section 5, provides: 
The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended, unless in case 
of rebellion or invasion, the public safety requires it, and then only in such manner 
as shall be prescribed by law. 
The privilege to the writ of habeas corpus is guaranteed without any provision for possible 
waiver by potential claimants. Idaho Code Section 19-2719's waiver provisions, therefore, have 
no application to habeas claims. 
For these reasons, if this Court does not reach Mr. Stuart's claims for UPUPA relief, it 
must reach them for writ of habeas corpus relief. 
IV. IDAHO COURTS SHOULD REACH THE MERITS OF MR. STUART'S 
CLAIMS. 
A. Idaho Courts Should Reach The Merits Of Mr. Stuart's Ineffective 
Assistance Of Counsel Claims Because Mr. Stuart Was Represented By The 
Same Lawyer From Trial, On Direct Appeal, Through His First Post- 
Conviction Petition And Appeal, And On His Second Post-Conviction 
Petition And Appeals Until 1995. 
This Court has strictly construed Section 19-2719 to provide a defendant a single 
"opportunity to raise all challenges to the conviction and sentence in a petition for postconviction 
relief except in those unusual cases where it can be demonstrated that the issues raised were not 
known and reasonably could not have been known within the time frame allowed by the statute." 
State v. Rhoades, 820 P.2d 665,677 (1991). In keeping with this constitution, the Court has also 
held that ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims do not fall within the unusual cases 
exception because they "should reasonably be known immediately upon the completion of trial. 
E.g., Fetterly v. State, 121 Idaho 417,419,825 P.2d 1073, 1075 (Idahol991), cert. denied, 506 
U.S. 1002 (1992) (citations omitted)." Pizzuto v. State, 127 Idaho 469,903 P.2d 58,61 (Idaho 
1995). See, also, Paz v. state, 123 Idaho 758,852 P.2d 1355, 1356-57 (Idaho1993). Indeed, the 
Court has held that Section 19-2719's "unusual cases" exception does not include a successive 
petition raising ineffective assistance of counsel claims even where trial counsel represented the 
defendant in his initial postconviction proceedings. McGivney v. State, 133 Idaho 695,701,992 
P.2d 144, 150 (Idaho1999). Consistent with the logic, the McGivney court held that even if 
counsel in petitioner's first postconviction proceedings was ineffective, Section 19-2719 would 
not allow that to excuse his failure to raise issues that should reasonably have been known" at the 
time of the first petition. Id. at 704, 153 (citing to LC. $19-2719(5)). 
Since McGivney, the Court has addressed waiver of ineffective assistance of counsel 
claims brought in successive petitions in five cases. Row v. State, 135 Idaho 573, 21 P.3d 895, 
reh'g denied (Idaho 2001); Rhoades v. State, 135 Idaho 299, 17 P.3d 243, reh 'g denied (Idaho 
2001); Fields v. State, 135 Idaho 286, 17 P.3d 230, reh 'g denied (Idaho 2001); Pizzuto v. State, 
134 Idaho 793, 10 P.3d 742, reh 'g denied (Idaho 2000); Sivak v. State, 134 Idaho 641, 8 P.3d 
636, reh 'g denied (Idaho 2000). In none of these cases did the court modify even slightly its 
earlier holding that-except for the extraordinary case "where prior counsel failed to file any 
petition for post-conviction relief," McGivney at 701, 150 (citing to Dunlap v. State, 13 1 Idaho 
576,577,961 P.2d 1179, 1190 (Idahol998)),-ineffective assistance of counsel claims are waived 
by failure to raise them within forty-two days of the entry of the judgment imposing a death 
sentence. Paz; Pizzuto; Fetterly; Dunlop; McGivney. 
The court below ruled that Mr. Stuart did not timely assert his ineffective assistance of 
trial counsel and appellate counsel claims. Mr. Stuart concedes that under Idaho law as described 
in the last several paragraphs, those claims were not timely filed. However, he contends that 
Idaho law as it relates to Section 19-2719 prevents postconviction petitioners "from timely 
raising [I ineffective assistance of counsel claims." Hoffman v. Arave, 236 F.3d 523, 535-36 
(2001). Specifically, Section 19-2719 prevents the timely assertion of ineffective assistance of 
counsel claims where the petitioner "continued to be represented by his original trial counsel 
during the forty-two day period." Hoffman at 534. As the Ninth Circuit observed, this court has 
squarely held that ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims are subject to the forty-two day 
filing requirement, and the fact that original trial counsel continues to represent death sentenced 
prisoners during that forty-two day window does not bring the claims within the exception to the 
forty-two day filing requirement. Id at 533. Where trial counsel continues to represent the 
petitioner during post-conviction proceedings, the petitioner is 
deprived of counsel who could review the record objectively for 
ineffective assistance of counsel claims. . . .The ~ractical realitv 
recognized by other states that employ the unitary post-conviction 
and appellate procedures-and, ultimately, recognized by the state 
of Idaho itself-is that "[ilt is the rare attorney who can be expected 
to contend on appeal that his representation was so poor that he 
deprived his client of a fair trial." Cihak [v. United States], 59 f.3d 
[296,] 303 [(2nd Cir. 1995)l. 
.... 
[Rlaising a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel requires that 
new counsel have the opportunity to conduct an investigation 
beyond the court records to uncover possible omissions made by 
trial counsel in the investigation and presentation of the case. See, 
e.g., Osborn v. Shillinger, 861 F.2d 612,623 (loth cir. 1988) 
("[I]neffectiveness claims are ordinarily inappropriate to raise on 
direct appeal because they ... cannot be made on the basis of the 
record[.]"); Cruz v. Warden, 907 F.2d 665, 670 (7th cir. 1990) ("An 
ineffective assistance claim alleging that counsel failed to prepare 
involves facts outside the trial record and presents a situation in 
which the Illinois courts will not invoke the res judicata or waiver 
doctrines."). 
Hoffman's ... allegations of ineffectiveness at trial, sentencing, and 
on appe al... required investigation outside of the record at trial. 
For the reasons outlined above, 919-2719 effectively prevented 
Hoffman from timely raising his ineffective assistance of counsel 
claims. 
Hoffman at 534-36. 
Mr. Stuart stands in Mr. Hoffman's shoes: Mr. Stuart was represented at trial, on direct 
appeal, and in postconviction proceedings until 1995-over a decade after Idaho's forty-two day 
filing requirement was enacted-by a single attorney, Mr. Robert Kinney.' Like Mr. Hoffman's 
claims, Mr. Stuart's ineffective assistance of counsel claims required investigation outside the 
trial record. Likewise, it required independent counsel to review the trial proceedings record for 
potential ineffective assistance of direct appeal counsel claims. Consequently, just as it did in 
Mr. Hoffman's case, Idaho Code Section 19-2719 "effectively prevented [Mr. Stuart] from 
timely raising his ineffective assistance of counsel claims." Id. 
By depriving Mr. Stuart of a full and fair opportunity to press his ineffective assistance of 
counsel claims, Idaho Code Section 19-2719 and associated law violates his state and federal 
right to due process. Consequently, Section 19-2719 must be struck, at least as applied to 
preclude this Court's considering Mr. Stuart's ineffective assistance of counsel claims. 
The court below did not address Mr. Stuart's ineffective assistance of postconviction 
counsel claims. He incorporates the above arguments for why the court should reach the merits 
of these claims. And he notes that he has raised those claims within a wholly reasonable time 
after identifying them. Hernandez v. State, 133 Idaho 794,992 P.2d 789,793 (Ct.App. 1999) 
("'ineffective assistance of prior post-conviction counsel, if true, provides sufficient reason for 
permitting newly asserted allegations to be raised in a subsequent post-conviction application. 
[Palmer v. Dermitt, 102 Idaho 5911 at 596,635 P.2d [955, at] 960 [(1981)]."). 
This Court should remand the case for an evidentiary hearing on Mr. Stuart's ineffective 
'Idaho law clearly provides that even though a petitioner's judgment of conviction and 
sentence of death was entered by the district court before Idaho Code Section 19-2719 was 
enacted, that provision nevertheless applies. See, e.g., Esquivel v. State, 128 Idaho 390,913 P.2d 
1160, reh 'g denied (Idaho1996). 
assistance of trial and appellate counsel claims. 
B. Idaho Courts Should Reach the Merits of the Prosecutorial Misconduct 
Claims. 
Mr. Stuart asserts four instances of prosecutorial misconduct: the prosecution (1) advised 
at least one witness not to testify that Mr. Stuart suffered from mental health difficulties; (2) 
knew that at the preliminary hearing, state witnesses ingested small tab pills which purportedly 
had a calming effect, (3) encouraged its prior bad acts witnesses to exchange their anticipated 
testimony by (a) housing them in the same small hotel for the preliminary hearing, (b) housing 
them in the same small hotel for the trial, and (c) bringing them into a single room before the 
preliminary hearing while failing to advise them not to exchange their anticipated testimony 
and/or by failing to take adequate steps to ensure that they did not exchange such testimony, and 
(4) encouraged its prior bad acts witnesses to exaggerate Mr. Stuart's misdeeds by providing a 
heightened sense of danger by (a) placing police officers at the hotel during the preliminary 
hearing and trial, (b) relating to at least one prior bad acts witness that the prosecution had 
received calls &om community members threatening Mr. Stuart, (c) compelling Mr. Stuart to 
wear leg irons at his preliminary hearing, and (d) using heightened security measures at trial 
including placing uniformed and armed police officers close to Mr. Stuart and requiring security 
checks of ail who entered the courtroom. The court below summarily dismissed each of Mr. 
Stuart's claims of prosecutorial misconduct on the ground that he knew or should have known 
each of them at the time of his direct appeal andfor at the time he filed his first petition for 
postconviction relief. 
The United States Supreme Court, however, has squarely rejected the position that 
petitioners who fail to discover facts supporting claims in a timely manner waive those claims, 
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even when the failure is due to prosecutorial misdeeds. Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668 (2004). 
The State here nevertheless urges, in effect, that the prosecution 
can lie and conceal and the prisoner still has the burden to discover 
the evidence, so long as thepotential existence of a prosecutorial 
misconduct claim might have been detected. . .Ordinarily, we 
presume that public officials have properly discharged their official 
duties. . .Court, litigants, and juries properly anticipate that 
obligations to refrain from improper methods to secure a 
conviction. . .plainly rest[ing] upon the prosecuting attorney, will 
be faithfully observed. Prosecutors' dishonest conduct or 
unwarranted concealment should attract no judicial approbation. 
Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668,696 (2004) (citations and quotation marks omitted). 
At the same time that it summarily dismissed the matter, the court below evaluated the 
claims as if they had been fully developed in an evidentiary hearing. Mr. Stuart moved for an 
evidentiary hearing, but the court below did not grant that motion. 
The Court should remand this matter for consideration of the prosecutorial misconduct 
claims on their merits, including an evidentiary hearing. 
C. Idaho Courts Should Reach the Merits of the Claim That the Prosecution 
Withheld from the Trial Court and the Defense Critical Mitigating 
Information While Simultaneously Arguing That No Such Information 
Existed. 
Mr. Stuart claimed that the prosecution obtained but withheld from the defense critical 
mitigating information, including the following information from interviews of potential 
witnesses conducted shortly after his arrest. Mr. Stuart was raised in a home characterized by 
physical violence between his parents. See Petition For Postconviction Relief and Petition for 
Writ ofHabeas Corpus ("Petition") at Appendix B at 3-4 (Elaine Haugen interview). Mr. Stuart 
was the target of his parents' sexual abuse. See Petition at Appendix A at I. He was aware from 
a young age that his father was raping his sisters, and he was profoundly troubled by his father's 
misconduct. See Petition Appendix C at 2,33-35.  Even Mr. Stuart's young wife was the target 
of the elder Mr. Stuart's sexual misconduct. See Petition at Appendix C at 35.  Mr. Stuart was 
the target of his father's physical abuse as well. See Petition at Appendix D at 1 (Sandra Stuart 
Interview), Appendix E at 1 (Susan Stuart Interview), and Appendix F at 1 (Memorandum 
regarding Susan Stuart Interview). It may well be that in addition to these horrifically 
destructive environmental influences, Mr. Stuart was predisposed to mental health difficulties, 
for his son was receiving psychiatric care and medication as an adolescent. See Petition at 
Appendix C at 40. Despite this horror and despite the fact that Ms. Toavs and Mr. Stuart wed in 
their senior year after learning that she was expecting, Mr. Stuart managed to graduate high 
school and, a short time later, enter an automotive mechanics school. See Petition at Appendix C 
at 2. Not surprisingly, however, over time Mr. Stuart began to self-medicate. See Petition at 
Appendix B at 7, Appendix G at 10 (Brandy Shale Interview), and Appendix H at 9 (Vickie 
Batey Interview). 
The court below ruled that because "[tlhe person with the best knowledge, insight and 
understanding of Stuart's childhood is Stuart and persons known to Stuart," the prosecution "did 
not hide, nor could he hide" the information. C.R. at 655 (Memorandum Opinion at 19). This 
ruling assumes that Mr. Stuart, having suffered in rich detail the experiences barely described 
above, was emotionally and mentally able to share what he knew. It is by now commonly known 
that victims of sexual and physical abuse often are unable to share their experiences with others. 
Trauma only start at the moment of abuse. Whether it ever ends is an open question. Yet the 
court below assumed, without the benefit of an evidentiary hearing, that Mr. Stuart was able to 
share with his lawyer-a lawyer who did no mitigation investigation whatsoever-the information 
which even the court below characterizes as describing "Mr. Stuart's childhood as replete with 
serious physical abuse inflicted by Stuart's father upon Stuart, his siblings, and his mother ....[ and 
which] describe a childhood in which Stuart was exposed to his father's incestuous sexual abuse 
of Stuart's sisters." C.R. at 654-55 (Memorandum Opinion at 18-19). 
The Court should remand the case for an evidentiary hearing on these claims. 
CONCLUSION 
For all these reasons considered individually and severally, this Court should reverse the 
lower court's summary dismissal. The Court should remand this matter for an evidentiary 
hearing on the merits of each claim raised. 
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